In our European Economic Review (2002) paper, we used pre-1998 data on countries participating in and leaving currency unions to estimate the effect of currency unions on trade using (then-) conventional gravity models. In this paper, we use a variety of empirical gravity models to estimate the currency union effect on trade and exports, using recent data which includes the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We have three findings. First, our assumption of symmetry between the effects of entering and leaving a currency union seems reasonable in the data but is uninteresting. Second, EMU typically has a smaller trade effect than other currency unions; it has a mildly stimulating effect at best. Third and most importantly, estimates of the currency union effect on trade are sensitive to the exact econometric methodology; the lack of consistent and robust evidence undermines confidence in our ability to reliably estimate the effect of currency union on trade.
Introduction
In this paper we estimate the effect of currency unions on trade. More specifically, we re-estimate this effect using a variety of models and a panel of annual data that covers more than 200 countries between 1948 and 2013. We do so largely to check the results of our European Economic Review (2002) paper, which used a panel approach to investigate the effect of currency unions on trade using data through 1997. That work involved an assumption, a caveat, and some analysis. In this paper, we examine each.
Motivation: An Assumption, a Caveat, and a Finding
In this paper, we use a data set that includes fifteen years of data for the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, hereafter "EMU". We take advantage of this to ask three questions.
First, we test whether our earlier assumption of symmetry between currency union entry and exit is justified in the data. The data set of our EER (2002) paper included only 16 switches into but 130 switches out of currency unions before 1998.
1 Given the paucity of data on entries into currency union, we explicitly assumed symmetry between entries and exits. 2 We can now check this assumption, since the many entries into EMU give us a non-trivial number of observations of currency union entries.
Our second question is related: does EMU have a trade effect similar to that of other currency unions? Our EER (2002) paper included no data on EMU, so we were cautious about the relevance of pre-1998 data for EMU:
"Caveats. There are issues associated with the applicability of our results. Since our sample ends before EMU, most of the currency unions involved countries that were either small, poor, or both; our results may therefore be inapplicable to EMU."
Finally, we ask whether the (many) advances in empirical modeling of trade flows since our EER (2002) paper are materially relevant to estimating the currency union effect on trade.
We worked hard in our earlier work to ensure that our results did not depend strongly on our precise methodology. For instance we wrote (highlights added):
"To summarize: a number of different panel estimators all deliver the conclusion that currency union has a strong positive effect on trade. … Our fixed effects estimates indicate that entry into/departure from a currency union leads bilateral trade to approximately double/halve, holding a host of other features constant. This result is not only economically and statistically significant, but seems relatively robust..."
"This result is economically large, statistically significant, and seems insensitive to a number of perturbations in our methodology."
The last dozen years has seen considerable methodological work in the area, perhaps most importantly the contributions of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . The literature has been ably surveyed recently by Head and Mayer (2014) ; see also Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) . We take advantage of this progress by estimating the effect of currency union on trade using newer techniques.
To preview our conclusions, we find that: a) symmetry looks OK; b) EMU is way different from other currency unions; and most disturbingly c) econometric methodology matters a lot.
Our finding of symmetry in trade patterns is weak and uninteresting, as we show below; it is also undermined by our final finding. In the large, we find EMU has a mildly stimulating effect on trade at best. Most importantly, we are forced to conclude that econometric methodology matters so much that it undermines confidence in our ability to estimate the effect of currency union on trade.
Initial Methodology and Data Set
We are interested in estimating the effect of currency unions on aggregated international trade. In our EER (2002) paper, we estimated a gravity model of international trade which was conventional for the time: where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as:
 T ijt denotes the average nominal value of bilateral trade between i and j at time t,
 D is the distance between i and j,  Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language,  Cont is unity if i and j share a land border and 0 otherwise,  FTA is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement and 0 otherwise,  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2).
 Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2),  Area is the land mass of the country,  ComCol is unity if i and j were colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer and 0 otherwise,  CurCol is unity if i and j are colonies at time t and 0 otherwise,  Colony is unity if i colonized j or vice versa and 0 otherwise,  ComNat is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample (e.g., France
and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda) and 0 otherwise,  CU is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t and 0 otherwise,   is a vector of nuisance coefficients,  {δ} is a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of year-specific effects,   ij represents the myriad other influences, assumed to be well behaved.
We begin by re-estimating this model on a longer data set that includes data through 2013. The coefficient of interest is γ, which we interpreted as the effect of a currency union on trade, ceteris paribus. We follow our earlier work by estimating this model in two ways. 3 First, we use ordinary least squares with standard errors which are robust to clustering (since dyads (country-pairs) are likely to be highly dependent across years). Second, we use the fixed effects "within" estimator by adding to (1) a comprehensive set of time-invariant dyadic specific intercepts to the equation; this estimator thus exploits only the time series dimension of the data set around country-pair averages.
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The Data Set
We rely on trade data drawn from the Direction of Trade (DOTS) data set assembled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The DoT data set covers bilateral trade between over 200 IMF country codes between 1948 and 2013 (with gaps; more on these below). Not all of the areas covered are countries in the conventional sense of the word; colonies (e.g., Gibraltar), territories (e.g., Guam), overseas departments (e.g., Guadeloupe), countries that gained their independence during the sample (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), and so forth are all included. We use the term "country" simply for convenience. 5 Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in U.S. dollars. We create an average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries by averaging all of the four possible measures potentially available.
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To this data set, we add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the gravity model. We add population and real GDP data (in constant dollars) from three sources. Statesman's Yearbook, and extended through 2013 so that EMU is included. Our definition of currency union is transitive; if dyads x-y, and x-z are in currency unions, then y-z is a currency union. In our sample, less than 2% of the observations involve dyads in a currency union. 
Results with Older (Trade) Models
We present estimates for (1) in  2.51, with a t-ratio exceeding 9).
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By far the biggest recent event in monetary unions has been the establishment of the EMU. In the next column of Table 1 , we add a separate dummy for members of EMU, to dramatic effect. 11 The currency union effect rises somewhat to 1.12, but the more interesting point estimate is that of EMU; the net effect of EMU membership is essentially nil in both economic and statistical terms; the net effect of EMU is (1.12-1.10≈) .02 with a standard error of .08. This is the first indication from the data that EMU seems to have a substantively different effect on trade than other monetary unions.
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The essence of our 2002 paper was to take maximal advantage of currency union status using a panel estimator with fixed dyadic (country-pair) effects, rather than relying simply on the least squares results of Table 1 . Accordingly, we add (more than 14,000) dyadic fixed effects and re-estimate (1); our (within) results are presented in Table 2 . As in Table 1, we tabulate results from our earlier paper at the extreme left.
The estimates in Table 2 -1≈) 51%. Clearly the post-1997 data changes our view of the currency union effect on trade substantively; even with the same statistical models, the data is delivering different results because of EMU.
The impression of a post-1997 break in the effect is reinforced by the Chow tests tabulated in Table 3 . The top row tests the hypothesis of model constancy -identical slopes of γ and {β} -when one compares the post-1997 period with the entire sample. The null hypothesis of model constancy is grossly inconsistent with the results of both the least squares estimator of Table 1 and the fixed effects estimator of Table 2 . The bottom row of Table 3 also finds non-constancy for a narrower hypothesis; EMU observations need to be modeled differently from other observations.
Symmetry
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are attempts to estimate the steady state effect of currency union on trade, holding other things constant. A related question is whether the trade effects of currency union entry and effect are symmetric; another question of interest is how long these effects take to make themselves apparent. In our earlier paper, we had a large number of observations on exits from currency unions but only a small number of entries into currency unions; hence we were forced to make our assumption of symmetry between the dynamic trade effects of currency union exit and entry. Since EMU began in 1999, we now have fifteen years of EMU data and can use this to test our assumption of symmetric dynamics. We begin with a graphical approach.
We replace our simple currency union dummy in (1) with lags after both currency union exits and entries and re-estimate our equation; we then use these results to test the hypothesis of equality between the dynamic trade effects after currency union exit with the (opposite signed) effects after entry. We use fourteen lags, since we have that many years of data following the start year of EMU. We also add a comparable number of leads (before both currency union exit and entry) so as to be able to test for symmetry in the run-up to monetary union exit/entry. That is, we estimate: 
where ENTRY ijt-k is a dummy which is 1 if countries i and j entered a currency union at time t-k and 0 otherwise; EXIT is defined analogously for exits from current union; and we let k run from -14 to 14.
The least squares point estimates of {φ} are portrayed in the upper-left graph of Figure   1 , along with the corresponding +/-two standard error band; the lower-left graph presents estimates of {θ}. We are interested in checking the comparability between EMU and other currency unions. Accordingly, we divide the ENTRY dummies into two mutually and jointly exhaustive sets of dummies and graph the resulting coefficients on the right side of the figure.
Analogues estimated with dyadic fixed effects are in Figure 2 ; since we have more confidence in the latter, we focus on them.
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Most of the results in Figure 2 seem intuitive. The effect of currency union on trade is substantial, in both economic and statistical terms, before currency union exit. Upon exit, the effect starts to shrink in both economic and statistical terms, though it lingers on even fourteen years after exit. The effect after currency union entry is also striking; there seems to be a positive effect before entry, perhaps indicating that the event is endogenous (a different issue).
The statistical effect of currency union entry on trade seems substantial, even long after entry.
Estimates of (1') allow us to test for symmetry rigorously. We are particularly interested in symmetry between the (dynamic) effects of entry into and exit from currency union. We ask "Does the additional boost to trade after currency union entry k years ago equal the reduction in trade after currency union exit k years ago?" 16 Since we estimate both leads and lags before entry/exit, we can test for symmetry both before and after currency entry/exit, as well as both before and after simultaneously. Our F-tests are tabulated in Table 4 ; the different columns present results from our least squares and fixed effects estimators.
The hypothesis of symmetric trade effects of currency union entry/exit works reasonably well for the fixed effect estimator, as indicated by the low F-tests. The same is true when we end the sample in 1997, in the middle of hypothesis that the trade effect after EMU entry is symmetric to that after exit from other currency unions; this seems close to validating our original assumption of symmetry. With new data and old methodology, the essence of our earlier work still looks reasonable; the question is whether it stands up to greater econometric scrutiny. We now turn to that question.
Results with Newer (Export) Models
We now pursue "theory-consistent estimation" of the gravity equation, closely following the suggestions in the recent survey by Head and Mayer (2014) . We focus on their "LSDV"  X ijt denotes the nominal value of bilateral exports from i to j at time t,  {λ it } is a complete set of time-varying exporter dummy variables, and  {ψ jt } is a complete set of time-varying importer dummy variables.
This equation is closely related to (1), with two substantive differences. First, the equation estimates the effect of currency union on (log) exports rather than trade. Second, it holds constant all country-specific "monadic" phenomena (both time-invariant, such as land area, and time-varying, such as GDP) rather than time-invariant dyadic phenomena. Consistently, (2) can only estimate the effect of pair-specific phenomena, like the currency union effect on exports.
The estimate of γ presented at the extreme left column of Table 5 is economically and statistically significant. Roughly comparable to the .63 point trade effect of Table 2 , the point estimate of the currency union effect on exports is .51. This is a large effect in economic (e .51 -1 ≈ 67%) and statistical terms (the t-ratio exceeds 20). Point estimates for the other bilateral estimates also seem intuitive in sign and size. We note in passing that even stronger results characterize the sample restricted to data before 1998, as shown in the right-hand column.
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The analysis presented above suggests that EMU has a substantially smaller trade effect than other currency unions. We check by adding a separate EMU dummy variable to our export model of (2); the estimates are also presented in Table 5 . Consistent with our earlier results but even more dramatically, the export-stimulating effect of EMU is lower than other currency unions. While other currency unions now seem to raise exports significantly (e .76 -1 ≈ 114%, with a t-ratio of 38), EMU more than completely offsets this effect. Indeed, the net effect of EMU on exports is negative; the point estimate is (.76-1.41≈) -.65 with a standard error of .03. Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) recommend adding dyadic fixed effects to (2), precisely in the context of estimating the currency union effect on exports. 18 We follow their suggestion on the right-hand side of The results of Figure 3 are difficult to interpret, at least in any straightforward way. In our sample, we have 1484 (bilateral) observations when an exporter-importer dyad severed a currency union. This seems like a large sample of observations, even taking into account dependencies between them. Yet leaving a currency union seems to have little effect on exports. More bizarrely, currency union entry has little effect on exports and seems indeed to lead them to decline significantly after some time. The graphs on the right show that this finding stems from EMU, the source of many observations of monetary union entry. Interesting enough, the effects of currency union entry and exit seem equally, and symmetrically, bizarre.
This finding of symmetry is ratified by the formal statistical tests tabulated in Table 6 ; these are analogous to those of Table 4 . The low F-tests are consistent with the hypothesis that the dynamic export effect of currency union entry is equal to (minus) that of currency union exit, both before and after currency union exit/entry. We take this as cold comfort, since it is the result of both exit and entry effects being equally weird, not exactly a ratification of the assumption we made in our (2002) EER paper based on sensible results.
On the other hand, adding dyadic fixed effects changes things radically. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 , which is the analogue to Figure 3 after country-pair fixed effects are added to (2'). The results are intuitive and echo those of Figure 2 ; exit from a currency union seems to make exports fall after a lag. More importantly, currency union entry -especially into EMU -leads exports to rise significantly over time.
Handling Zeros and Heteroskedasticity
What is the source of the inconsistent and sometimes bizarre effects that currency union (especially EMU) entry seems to have on exports? It may be the result of a short span of data on EMU; we only have fifteen years of data on EMU now, while we exploited 30 lags in our (2002) EER paper. Still, the literature has recently focused on more technical problems likely to render the estimates from (2) and (2') problematic.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argued persuasively that least squares estimates of (1) and (2) where X ijt =0 if we have zero or missing exports for the relevant countries.
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Our estimates are presented in Figure 5 . The lightly shaded area in the panel above represents the least squares point estimate of γ from (3) surrounded by a +/-two-standard error confidence interval; the panel below represents the analogous confidence interval for γ EMU (point estimates are in white). Our least squares estimates of γ, the currency union effect on log exports, are consistently positive, averaging 1.29 and thus indicating a large economic effect (since e 1.29 -1 ≈ 263%). They are also consistently different from zero and seem stable over time. 22 Consistent with the results of the left-hand part of Table 5 , the additional effect of EMU on exports portrayed in the bottom of panel is significantly negative and large. The effect is significant in both the statistical and economic senses; it averages -2.1 and thus overwhelms the positive effect of γ. Succinctly, the least squares estimates indicate that EMU has a significantly depressing effect on exports, contrasting sharply with the large positive effect exhibited by other currency unions. 
Summarizing the Net EMU Effect
The most interesting and important coefficient of interest in this literature is the net effect of EMU on trade and exports, ceteris paribus; (2), leads to the conclusion that EMU has significantly reduced trade, and once more this conclusion seems insensitive. Still, adding dyadic fixed effects reverses the result and restores the conclusion of a large positive effect of EMU on exports, another robust 
Summary and Conclusion
In our EER (2002) paper, we concluded that "a pair of countries which joined/left a currency union experienced a near-doubling/halving of bilateral trade." This conclusion was based on: a) an assumption of symmetry between the consequences of currency union exits and entries; b) a caveat that EMU might be different from other currency unions; and c) evidence that our results were insensitive to the precise econometric methodology. In this paper, we re-estimate this effect using a variety of models and a panel of annual data that covers more than 200 countries between 1948 and 2013, including fifteen years of EMU. As it turns out, the assumption of symmetry between entry and exit seems reasonable, if often uninteresting. The fear that prompted our caveat was warranted; EMU seems to be different from other currency unions. Importantly, we have little confidence in either of our first two results because of our final finding. We were wrong on the final point of our EER (2002) paper; the econometric methodology used to estimate the currency union effect matters, a lot.
If one took seriously the results from least squares estimation without fixed effects, one would conclude that EMU had essentially no effect on trade, while other currency unions had an economically and statistically huge effect. Moreover, this result seems insensitive to a variety of perturbations of the basic methodology. On the other hand, adding dyadic fixed effects substantially lowers one's estimate of the currency union effect, while simultaneously and significantly raising the effect of EMU; again, these results seem robust in the context of the technique. But switching to a more modern model of exports with time-varying country fixed effects would again change the conclusion, since those estimates imply that EMU has an enormous negative effect on exports while other currency unions have a huge positive effect; sadly, these results also seem insensitive within technique. Then again, adding dyadic fixed effects to this model lowers the currency union effect but leaves it positive and significant, while indicating that EMU has an even larger positive effect on exports. Finally, Poisson estimates of the currency union on exports vary substantially over time and rarely overlap with those of least squares; they are often small, negative and insignificantly different from zero.
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